

Security Assessment

NEXTYPE.FINANCE

Apr 19th, 2021



Summary

This report has been prepared for NEXTYPE.FINANCE smart contracts, to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of their Smart Contract as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Dynamic Analysis, Static Analysis, and Manual Review techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases given they are currently missing in the repository;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.



Overview

Project Summary

Project Name	NEXTYPE.FINANCE
Description	NEXTYPE is an integrated application ecosystem between gaming, NFT and DeFi that can be cross-chain(cross platform).
Platform	Heco
Language	Solidity
Codebase	https://github.com/nextypefinance/miningtycoon/tree/master
Commits	1fe3bb4e88f956e172789c4f73a925a0d395bc6e

Audit Summary

Delivery Date	Apr 19, 2021
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis, Manual Review
Key Components	

Vulnerability Summary

Total Issues	6
Critical	0
Major	0
Minor	2
Informational	4
Discussion	0




Audit Scope

ID	file	SHA256 Checksum
NXT	NXTP.sol	1da877d953a747314be8546f7cd7262d28d303f9d2a5f8033c5e66e7d063610c
NXP	NXTPFarm.sol	6d1bc38fc18fadeb151043e864760be171e90db3a343f238eadb2de33f868c13



Findings



ID	Title	Category	Severity	Status
NXP-01	Missing Check Duplicated Token	Logical Issue	Minor	
NXP-02	Potential Reentrancy Risk	Volatile Code	Minor	
NXP-03	Potential Arithmetic Operations Overflow	Volatile Code	Informational	
NXP-04	Missing Emit Events	Optimization	Informational	
NXP-05	Lack of Input Validation	Volatile Code	Informational	
NXT-01	Redundant Codes	Logical Issue	Informational	



NXP-01 | Missing Check Duplicated Token

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	Minor	NXTPFarm.sol: 19~21	

Description

There is no validation to avoid adding duplicated tokens in function addAllowedTokens.

Recommendation

Consider checking the new token whether added before.

Alleviation



NXP-02 | Potential Reentrancy Risk

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	Minor	NXTPFarm.sol: 24~34, 37~43, 66~76, 80~93	

Description

There is a potential reentrancy risk on key actions since the implementation of staking tokens are unknown. Examples:

```
24 stakeTokens()

37 unstakeTokens()

66 stakeTokens2()

80 unstakeTokens2()
```

Recommendation

Consider applying the modifier nonReentrant of contact ReentrancyGuard of openzeppelin to the above key functions. Example:

```
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
function stakeTokens(uint256 _amount, address token, uint256 pool) public nonReentrant {
    ...
}
```

Alleviation



NXP-03 | Potential Arithmetic Operations Overflow

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	Informational	NXTPFarm.sol: 31~32, 73~74	

Description

Arithmetic operation by plain arithmetic operators may cause overflow.

Recommendation

Consider using functions of SafeMath to safeguard the arithmetic operations.

```
30 stakingBalance[pool][token][msg.sender] =
31  stakingBalance[pool][token][msg.sender].add(_amount);

stakingBalance2[pool][token1][msg.sender] = stakingBalance2[pool][token1]
[msg.sender].add(_amount1);
stakingBalance2[pool][token2][msg.sender] = stakingBalance2[pool][token2]
[msg.sender].add(_amount2);
```

Alleviation



NXP-04 | Missing Emit Events

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Optimization	Informational	NXTPFarm.sol: 19~21, 24~34, 37~43, 66~76, 80~93	

Description

Several key actions are defined without event declarations. Examples:

```
addAllowedTokens();

stakeTokens();

unstakeTokens();

stakeTokens2();

unstakeTokens2();
```

Recommendation

Consider emitting events for key actions. Example:

```
event AddAllowedTokens(address token);
function addAllowedTokens(address token) public onlyOwner {
  allowedTokens.push(token);
  emit AddAllowedTokens(token);
}
```

Alleviation



NXP-05 | Lack of Input Validation

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	Informational	NXTPFarm.sol: 19~21	○ Resolved

Description

The passed parameter token should be verified as a non-zero value to prevent being mistakenly assigned as address(0) in functions addAllowedTokens and unstakeTokens.

The passed parameter token1 and token2 should be verified as a non-zero value to prevent being mistakenly assigned as address(0) in functions unstakeTokens2.

Recommendation

Check that the address is not zero by adding following check.

```
require(token != address(0), "token is zero address");
```

Alleviation



NXT-01 | Redundant Codes

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	Informational	NXTP.sol: 21	

Description

The function call transferOwnership(_msgSender()); is redundant since it is already done in the constructor of parent contract Ownable:

```
//Ownable.sol
constructor () internal {
    address msgSender = _msgSender();
    _owner = msgSender;
    emit OwnershipTransferred(address(0), msgSender);
}
```

Recommendation

Consider removing the function call transferOwnership(_msgSender());.

Alleviation



Appendix

Finding Categories

Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings refer to exhibits that do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

Mathematical Operations

Mathematical Operation exhibits entail findings that relate to mishandling of math formulas, such as overflows, incorrect operations etc.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings are exhibits that detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block.timestamp works.

Control Flow

Control Flow findings concern the access control imposed on functions, such as owner-only functions being invoke-able by anyone under certain circumstances.

Volatile Code

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that may result in a vulnerability.

Data Flow

Data Flow findings describe faults in the way data is handled at rest and in memory, such as the result of a struct assignment operation affecting an in-memory struct rather than an in storage one.

Language Specific

Language Specific findings are issues that would only arise within Solidity, i.e. incorrect usage of private or delete.

Coding Style



Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code and comment on how to make the codebase more legible and as a result easily maintainable.

Inconsistency

Inconsistency findings refer to functions that should seemingly behave similarly yet contain different code, such as a constructor assignment imposing different require statements on the input variables than a setter function.

Magic Numbers

Magic Number findings refer to numeric literals that are expressed in the codebase in their raw format and should otherwise be specified as constant contract variables aiding in their legibility and maintainability.

Compiler Error

Compiler Error findings refer to an error in the structure of the code that renders it impossible to compile using the specified version of the project.



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Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. CertiK's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. CertiK's goal is to help reduce the attack vectors and the high level of variance associated with utilizing new and consistently changing technologies, and in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze.



About

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